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Abstract: What attitude should philosophers take toward their favorite philosophical theories? I 
argue that the answer is belief and middling to low credence. I begin by discussing why 
disagreement has motivated the view that we cannot rationally believe our philosophical theories. 
Then, I show why considerations from disagreement actually better support my view. I provide 
two additional arguments for my view: the first concerns roles for belief and credence and the 
second explains why believing one’s philosophical theories is superior to accepting them. I close by 
addressing objections, including implications my view has for the Lockean thesis, the view that 
there is a normative connection between belief and high credence. 
 





What attitude should philosophers take toward their favorite philosophical theories? This paper 
concerns this question. Note that our question is not a descriptive one, about what attitude 
philosophers in fact take to their philosophical theories, which is largely an empirical matter. 
Instead, we are concerned with a normative question: what attitude is rational to take to one’s 
favorite philosophical theories?  
 
One might think that, at first blush, it’s perfectly rational to believe your favorite philosophical 
views. After all, your favorite views are the ones you champion, assert, and argue for. Presumably, 
you’re not only aware of arguments in their favor, but you also have answers to common 
objections and good reasons to reject rival views.  
 
Recently, however, a number of authors have argued that it is not rational to believe our 
philosophical views. A common motivation for this involves disagreement. Philosophical matters 
are highly controversial, and there’s significant disagreement among smart people about almost 
everything in philosophy. Given conciliationism, the popular idea that we should change our opinions 
when we encounter smart, well-informed people who disagree, it’s natural to think that we likewise 
should not believe our philosophical views. Call the view that it is epistemically unjustified to 
believe philosophical theories the no-belief view. 
 
My goal in this paper is to argue that philosophers can rationally believe their philosophical views. 
More precisely, my thesis is that it is epistemically permissible for philosophers to believe their 
favorite philosophical views; however, they should have middling or even low credences in them. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is about disagreement. I raise some problems for 
the way that the arguments for the no-belief view heavily rely on conciliationism. Then, drawing 
on my previous work and the work of Lara Buchak (2021), I explain why my approach can solve 
problems that conciliationism creates for the no-belief view, while also doing justice to many of 
the intuitions that underlie conciliationism. In Section 3, I provide two additional arguments for 
my view. The first appeals to the roles of belief and credence, and the second explains why 
believing philosophical theories is preferable to accepting them. In Section 4, I address objections, 
including the worry that it seems irrational to believe something if one has a middling or low 
credence in it. I conclude in Section 5.   
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A clarification before we begin. When I use the phrase “favorite philosophical views” or 
“philosophical views”, I don’t simply mean any view that a philosopher defends in print; that’s too 
broad, and in some cases, people explicitly disavow views even though they publish in their 
defense. Instead, I’m focused on theories that a researcher personally identifies with—theories 
about which someone would say “that’s my view.” Often, this is associated with a set of behaviors, 
including a commitment to the view, defending the view, advocating for the view, the view’s 
shaping one’s future research, and one’s asserting that the view is correct (Fleisher 2018: 2650). 





One of the primary motivations for the no-belief view appeals to the problem of disagreement.1 Will 
Fleisher (2021: 365) notes, “There seems to be pervasive disagreement at the cutting edge of just 
about any field. It’s hard to imagine what a cutting-edge field would look like without such 
disagreement.” Furthermore, disagreement seems to infect philosophy as a discipline in a special 
way. As Jason Brennan (2010: 1) says, “Philosophers disagree immensely in significant ways. Our 
best philosophers disagree over the doctrines, methods, and even the aims of philosophy.” 
Similarly, Tom Kelly (2006: 173) observes, “[p]hilosophy is notable for the extent to which 
disagreements with respect to even those most basic questions persist among its most able 
practitioners, despite the fact that the arguments thought relevant to the disputed questions are 
typically well-known to all parties to the dispute.” 
 
Because of this widespread disagreement, a number of philosophers maintain that we ought not 
believe philosophical theories.2 Zach Barnett (2019: 109) explains, “Given certain assumptions 
about the nature of these philosophical disagreements, and given certain assumptions about the 
epistemic import of disagreement more generally, one might come to doubt that our controversial 
philosophical beliefs are rational.” Even stronger, Sanford Goldberg (2013: 277) says, “…the sort 
of disagreements we encounter in philosophy—disagreements that often take the form that I have 
elsewhere called systematic peer disagreements—make it unreasonable to think that there is any 
knowledge, or even justified belief, when the disagreements themselves are systematic.” David 
Christensen (2014: 147) largely agrees: “Indeed, it would seem that I should probably have few, if 
any, confident beliefs at all about philosophically controversial matters!”  
 
Arguments for the no-belief view frequently appeal to conciliationist views of disagreement. 
According to conciliationism, we should change our opinions in response to disagreement with 
smart people.3 And there’s something intuitive about this position: Ignoring the fact that smart 
people disagree with us seems close-minded and dogmatic. Christensen’s (2007: 193) classic 
restaurant case brings out this intuition clearly: if we are trying to decide how to split our bill at 
the restaurant, and you calculate we each owe $45 while I calculate we each owe $43, how should 
I react upon learning you disagree with me (assuming we are equally good at math)? Most would 
argue that I should change my opinion—moving, in some way, closer to your opinion. 
Conciliationists are divided on how exactly we should alter our opinions—some endorse an “equal 
weight” view on which we should give our peer’s opinion the same weight as our own opinion 
                                                        
1 Some key works in the epistemology of disagreement include Kelly (2005), Christensen (2009), Lackey (2008), Pittard 
(2019), and the essays in Warfield and Feldman (2010) and in Christensen and Lackey (2013). 
2 For arguments along these lines, see Brennan (2010), Kornblith (2010, 2013), Licon (2012), Goldberg (2009, 2013, 
2015), Christensen (2014), Barnett (2019), Plakias (2019), Fleisher (2018, 2019, 2021-a, 2021-b). 
3 For defenses and discussions of conciliationism, see Christensen (2007, 2009, 2016), Elga (2007), Feldman (2007), 
Kornblith (2010), Turnbull and Sampson (2020), and Fleisher (2021-b), among others. 
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(see Elga 2007); others discuss more nuanced updating rules (Easwaran et al 2016). Nonetheless, 
they agree that peer disagreement ought to change our opinions. 
 
However, the fact that the no-belief view relies on conciliationism creates two serious problems. 
First, conciliationism is controversial. Other philosophers defend steadfastness, the view that we can 
maintain our opinions in the face of disagreement.4 The arguments that we shouldn’t believe our 
philosophical views will have much less appeal to those who accept or lean toward steadfastness. 
 
A second problem for the no-belief view is that conciliationism is subject to several serious 
objections. In general, you seem to lose something epistemically valuable if you constantly defer 
to the opinions of others. If conciliationism is true, virtually no one can rationally have strong 
opinions about controversial matters.  
 
This general skeptical worry has been made more specific in two ways. First, some have also argued 
that always changing your views in response to disagreement leads to a problematic spinelessness—
a requirement to give up our most deeply-held beliefs (see Elga 2007; Sherman 2015; Fritz 2018). 
Fritz (2018: 103) explains, “Certain moral beliefs are both very intuitively secure and deeply 
controversial. For this reason, several conciliationists attempt to explain why their theories do not 
recommend spinelessness about moral belief in particular.” While Fritz focuses on beliefs about 
morality, other deeply-held philosophical beliefs in domains like politics and religion seem to fall 
prey to the same worry: we can’t take a stand on our deepest convictions in the face of controversy, 
but must spinelessly surrender these beliefs. Second, conciliationism is subject to the self-undermining 
worry. If conciliationism is true, we cannot rationally believe conciliationism, since many smart 
people disagree about it (see Christensen 2009: 762; Sampson 2019; Fleisher 2021-b). 
 
Not only does conciliationism seem to potentially lead to problematic skepticism, but there’s also 
evidence that remaining steadfast in the face of disagreement has epistemic benefits. For instance, 
Kitcher (1990, 1993), Muldoon (2013), De Cruz & De Smedt (2013), and Dormandy 
(forthcoming) argue that diverse opinions among researchers lead to epistemic goods, e.g. making 
it more likely that a group will reach the truth in the long run. Lougheed (2020) directly frames 
these facts as a challenge for conciliationism.  
 
Thus, steadfastness and conciliationism both seem to have things going for them, but we cannot 
accept both. Or can we? Notice that we’ve framed both views in terms of one’s “opinions”, but 
this is ambiguous between two mental states: beliefs and credences. Believing p is taking p to be 
the case or regarding p as true. Beliefs are a coarse-grained mental state, on which there are three 
attitudes one can take toward a proposition: believe p, disbelieve p, and withhold belief on p. 
Credences, on the other hand, are a fine-grained mental state that measures the subjective 
probability of a proposition on a scale from [0,1], where 1 represents certainty that p is true, and 
0 represents certainty that p is false. I may believe both that modus ponens is valid and that it will 
be sunny tomorrow, but my credence is the former is quite close to 1, whereas my credence in the 
latter may be around 0.9.  
 
If we change our credences, but not our beliefs, in response to disagreement, this carves a middle 
way between these two main positions in the epistemology of disagreement. In virtue of 
conciliating with our credences, we can acknowledge and give weight to smart people’s opinions, 
avoiding dogmatism and closemindedness. On the other hand, in virtue of remaining steadfast in 
our beliefs, we can take a stand on controversial matters, avoid spinelessness, and glean 
                                                        
4 For defenses and discussions of steadfastness, see van Inwagen (1996), Rosen (2001), Kelly (2005, 2007, 2010, 2013), 
Pettit (2006), Conee (2010). 
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disagreement’s benefits (see Jackson 2021 and Buchak 2021). Maybe we can actually have our cake 
and eat it too. 
 
There are several additional reasons that disagreement should change one’s credences, but not 
one’s beliefs. First, it deals with all three worries for conciliationism: spinelessness, self-
undermining, and loss of epistemic benefits. On the view in question, we aren’t forced to 
spinelessly give up our most deeply-held beliefs. We can believe—and thus take a stand on—these 
controversial convictions; we should just have middling to low credences in them. It also solves 
the self-undermining problem. The problem of how we can rationally believe conciliationism if 
conciliationism is true is only a problem if one holds to belief-conciliationism. On my view, 
conciliationists should lower their credence in conciliationism, but there are no qualms about 
believing it. Finally, the view permits researchers to maintain diverse beliefs in the face of 
philosophical disagreement, and thus glean the epistemic benefits of steadfastness.  
 
The final two reasons to prefer belief-steadfastness and credal-conciliationism are related. Third, 
credal-conciliationism is flexible in a way belief-conciliationism is not. In the belief case, if I believe 
p and you, my peer, believe not-p, perhaps we should both suspend. But what if I believe p and 
you withhold? Forming a new belief, e.g. probably-p, doesn’t tell me what attitude I should take 
toward the bare proposition p. Assuming conciliation is a matter of changing our attitude toward 
a certain proposition, beliefs are too coarse-grained to capture any kind of nuanced updating rule. 
Credences, by contrast, are fine-grained enough to capture more nuanced updating rules, including 
the split-the-difference view (although, this can lead to failures of communtivity—see Gardiner 
2014), conditionalization, and the “UPCO” rule proposed by Easwaran et al (2016). 
 
Fourth, credences allow us to conciliate in different ways, depending on if the disagreement is with 
a peer, superior, inferior, expert, or novice. Much attention in the disagreement literature has been 
put on epistemic peers—those who are essentially your epistemic equals (but see King 2012 for 
an argument that peerhood is rare). But disagreement’s epistemic significance goes beyond 
peerhood; in fact, if conciliationism is true, we should potentially conciliate more, rather than less, 
when we encounter disagreement with superiors or experts. Credal-conciliationism allows us to 
conciliate in different ways depending on who we disagree with; beliefs are again too coarse-
grained to allow this.5  
 
Given that disagreement is one of the main reasons on offer for the no-belief view, this suggests 
that, contra the no-belief view, maybe we’ve been conciliating with the wrong attitude. There are 
several reasons the combination of belief-steadfastness with credal-conciliationism is attractive. 
On my view, even a relatively conciliatory approach to disagreement does not force us to give us 
our beliefs in the face of disagreement. Next, we turn to two additional arguments for the 
permissibility of believing philosophical theories.  
 
 
3. TWO ARGUMENTS  
 
3.1 Roles for belief and credence   
 
As discussed above, beliefs are a coarse-grained, tripartite mental state, whereas credences are a 
fine-grained mental state. One might wonder why epistemologists discuss and appeal to both 
states; except for the (unpopular) eliminativist views, most epistemologists think that we have both 
beliefs and credences.  
                                                        
5 See Jackson (2020) for an expansion on, and further defense of, these third and fourth considerations. 
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A common answer to this question appeals to different roles that belief and credence play. For 
example, beliefs enable you to take a stand and have a view of the world. When you believe that it 
is raining or that God exists, you represent the world in a certain way, and you’re taking a stand 
on the truth of some matter. A 0.9 credence that it is raining or that God exists does not take a 
stand or represent the world in the same way. Non-extreme credences leave possibilities open in 
a way that beliefs do not (cf. Ross and Schroeder 2014). When it comes to philosophical theories, 
the ability to believe them lets us take a stand on our favorite theory, and represent the world such 
that it is true.  
 
Credences, on the other hand, track one’s precise level of evidential support. Credences change 
(via conditionalization) as you encounter new evidence for or against p. Not all evidential changes 
need to change your beliefs though, even though they should change your credences. For example, 
suppose I check the forecast tomorrow at there’s a 95% chance of rain, so I both believe and have 
a high credence it will rain tomorrow. Then, I check the forecast again a few hours later; now 
there’s only an 85% chance of rain. This small change in my evidence need not change my belief 
that it will rain tomorrow, as I still have strong evidence that it will rain. However, I should alter 
my credence—from 0.95 to 0.85. Even those who think credence and belief are closely connected 
would agree that small changes in evidence can change our credences without forcing us to alter 
our beliefs.6 Thus, credences are fine-grained enough to tightly track our level of evidence for and 
against some proposition; beliefs are too coarse-grained to play this role.  
 
These natural and intuitive roles for belief and credence fit well with the idea that we can believe, 
but should have middling (or low) credences in our favorite philosophical views. Believing our 
philosophical views lets us take a stand on their truth, mentally represent the world such that they 
are true, and honestly say, “that’s my view!” However, one lowers one’s credence in light of the 
counterevidence against one’s favorite theory—e.g. the pervasive disagreement and lack of 
consensus in philosophy.  
 
3.2 Belief vs. acceptance  
 
Some who argue for the no-belief view have suggested an alternative: we ought to accept them. 
Acceptance is acting as if something is true, and various stories have been told about why it can 
be rational to act as if our favorite philosophical views are true, even if we do not believe them.7 
Fleisher (2018), for example, argues for a kind of acceptance called endorsement. Endorsing a theory 
is associated with acts such as: a disposition to assert and defend a theory, treating a theory as a 
premise in one’s reasoning, having a commitment to a theory, and the theory’s shaping one’s 
research program. 
 
Fleisher argues that a research community should endorse a wide range of theories—but not 
believe them. This is, in part, because some of the epistemic benefits of disagreement can be 
gleaned via diverse endorsement. He explains (2018: 2657), “Endorsement enables the kind of 
resilient commitment and advocacy of a theory which leads to the valuable disagreement described 
by both the psychological literature and scientific cases studies.” He also explains how diverse 
endorsement promotes collective epistemic goals—what he called “extrinsic epistemic reasons”—
such as making it more likely a group will reach the truth in the long run, and promoting other 
epistemic goals of inquiry (even if indirectly; see p. 2662).  
 
                                                        
6 One exception is those who defend the belief-is-credence-1 view, e.g. Greco (2015), Dodd (2016). 
7 For similar proposals, see Goldberg (2013), Palmira (2019, 2020), Barnett (2019), Fleisher (2020, 2021-a, 2021-b).  
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Fleisher’s view and others raise the question: why not just accept (or endorse) our philosophical 
theories, especially if the epistemic benefits of disagreement are available without belief? There are 
at least two reasons that believing our philosophical theories is superior to accepting them. First, 
the spinelessness worry seems to infect the acceptance-only view in a problematic way. Consider 
philosophical views at the core of my web of belief: factory farming is morally objectionable, God 
exists, epistemic permissivism is true. On the acceptance-only view, I can act as if these are true, 
defend them in print, and even assert them. However, there is still something missing. Imagine the 
following conversation: 
 
 Me: I believe that factory farming is immoral.  
Conciliationist Cam: Philosophers disagree about whether factory farming is morally 
wrong, so it’s not rational for you to believe that. 
Me: Wait, really? I can’t take a stand on a firm conviction that I have, simply because 
people disagree with me?  
Conciliationist Cam: Don’t worry! You can still act as if factory farming is wrong! You 
just can’t believe it.  
Me: That doesn’t offer much comfort. You're still saying it is irrational for me to take a 
doxastic stance on one of my deeply held philosophical convictions. 
 
I cannot truly take a stand on my favorite theory in the way that beliefs allow. This is because 
beliefs are inherently representational states; if I believe p, then I represent the world such that p 
is true. But if believing my favorite philosophical view is irrational, then representing my favorite 
philosophical theory as true would be irrational. My loyalty to my views can only be a matter of 
action, but the mental, representational loyalty is irrational. This seems to raise spinelessness worry 
all over again. 
 
Furthermore, on at least some of the acceptance views, my commitment to a theory is domain-
relative. As Fleisher (2018: 2652–3) explains: “Endorsement is specific to a research domain: a 
subject endorses something for the purposes of a particular domain of inquiry… Endorsement is 
a ‘’fragmented’’ attitude, meaning that it is compartmentalized rather than being a global feature 
of the subject’s mental state.” Fleisher goes on to explain that we may give up our commitment to 
a theory, or stop acting as if it is true, outside of a research context; we may also endorse different 
theories in different domains of inquiry. However, this makes the spinelessness problem even 
worse. If I can only accept my theory in certain research domains, then not only can I not believe it in 
any domain, but I can only accept the theory in certain contexts. And in other contexts, I can 
accept mutually exclusive theories in the same way. This is a weak, flimsy commitment (if it can 
even be rightfully called a commitment at all). I would like to think that I can stand up for my 
favorite theory in all contexts—in both what I believe and in how I act.  
 
Second, and relatedly, the idea that it is irrational to believe philosophical theories seems implausibly 
strong. While there may simply be a clash of intuitions on this point, part of the problem lies in 
the fact that those defending the no-belief view have relied quite a bit on conciliationism and paid 
much less attention to the motivations for steadfastness. Can I really not have opinions on 
something simply because it is controversial? Consider the philosophers who believe their 
philosophical views after careful thought, coming up with new arguments for them, defending 
them again and again in print, and responding to all the major objections. It seems strong to claim 
that, by believing their views, they are doing something irrational.  
 
It’s much more plausible to say that they aren’t irrational for believing their theories, but they’re 
irrational if they are overly confident in them. This overconfidence is characterized by an excessively 
high credence, which leads to dogmatism and being closed off to new evidence. Due to the 
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controversial nature of the views, they should be less confident—and the more controversial the 





4.1 Objection 1: Belief and low credence?  
 
Perhaps the most important objection to my view is the question of whether it could ever be 
rational to believe p, and, at the same time, have a middling to low credence in p. Brennan (2010: 
1-2) notes: “[The skeptic] notices that philosophers have extensive disagreement about the answers 
to [philosophical] questions and thus concludes that the probability of her getting the true answer 
by pursuing philosophy is low.” If Brennan is right, then our credence in any given philosophical 
theory should be low—say, below 0.5. However, it’s prima facie plausible that we shouldn’t believe 
something if our credence in it is below 0.5. Hence, this is a straightforward argument that we 
shouldn’t believe our philosophical theories. 
 
This argument has two premises. One, that usually, the credence one should have in their favorite 
philosophical theory is below 0.5. Two, that you ought not believe p if your credence is p is below 
0.5. Both premises are resistible.  
 
First, let’s consider the question of what credence one should have in their favorite philosophical 
theories. All parties involved agree that, in most cases, one’s credence in their favorite theory 
should not be extremely high, e.g. in the 0.8–1 range. However, it’s also not immediately clear to 
me that it should always be below 0.5, either. Presumably, you have arguments that raise the 
probability of your favorite theory, you’ve thought of responses to the major objections to your 
theory, and you also have serious objections to rival theories (which you may not think defenders 
of those theories have satisfying answers to). These considerations, then, may warrant giving your 
favorite theory a bigger piece of the “credal pie” than rival theories. While you are probably 
unwarranted to give the theory a credence that is high in absolute terms—it will depend on the 
number and plausibility of the rival theories, and the strength of the arguments for your theory 
and the objections to it—it may, at least in some cases, warrant a credence slightly above 0.5 for 
your favorite theory, even with a fair amount of credal conciliating. 
 
Let’s consider a concrete example. Suppose you are a libertarian about free will. You think 
libertarian free will is the best explanation for the fact that people are morally responsible for their 
actions, and you find the consequence argument for incompatibilism quite persuasive. You think 
the other two live options—compatibilism and hard determinism—also both have things going 
for them, and you know many smart people who defend both views. Nonetheless, you think the 
argumentative scales tip in favor of libertarianism. For that reason, you have a 0.55 credence in 
libertarianism, a 0.25 credence in compatibilism, and 0.2 credence in hard determinism. This is 
admittedly a less-conciliatory credence distribution, but is nonetheless consistent with a moderate 
degree of credal conciliationism, especially if we reject rigid updating rules like the split-the-
difference view (as many conciliationists do).  
 
Those who are sympathetic to the Lockean thesis may prefer this first response. The Lockean thesis 
is the view that S rationally believes p iff S has a rational credence in p above some (probabilistic) 
threshold (see Locke 2014, Dorst 2019, Fitelson & Shear 2018, Lee and Silvia forthcoming). Once 
your credence drops below that threshold, it’s irrational for you to believe the view in question.  
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That said, even for Lockeans, there is a degree of flexibility here. First, there are different points 
at which we could set the threshold, and the lower we set it, the more steadfast we can be when it 
comes to believing our favorite philosophical theories. Furthermore, it is worth distinguishing two 
kinds of Lockean thresholds: the Lockean threshold at which belief is rationally required, and the 
Lockean threshold at which belief is rationally permitted.8 The threshold at which belief is required 
may be significantly above 0.5, but the permissibility threshold could be quite low, e.g. slightly 
above 0.5 (or even lower than 0.5). Thus, one can accept both my view and the Lockean thesis; 
depending on the version of the Lockean thesis we accept, our beliefs in our philosophical views 
can be more or less steadfast. 
 
A second response denies that you ought not believe p if your credence is p is below 0.5. Some 
readers may balk at this suggestion. However, several cases of this are already present in the current 
literature. Hawthorne, Rothschild, & Spectre (2016) discuss the following case. Suppose there is a 
3-horse race, and horse A is 48% likely to win, horse B is 28% likely to win, and horse C is 27% 
likely to win. Even though the probability that horse A wins is below 50%, it is rational to believe 
horse A will win, since A is the most likely of the live options.  
 
I find this case helpful because it may be analogous to the credence distribution that many have 
regarding their favorite philosophical theory and alternative theories. We can also tweak the 
numbers so one’s credence one’s favorite theory is even closer to the alternative theories. 
Furthermore, this need not commit us to the general principle that is it always rational to believe 
the most likely salient alternative—but merely that this is sometimes rational, even if your credence 
in that alternative is below 0.5. 
 
Here are a few other cases. In a preface paradox scenario, you may rationally believe the 
conjunction of all the claims in your book, but your credence in the conjunction of all the claims 
in your book should be quite low (see Smith 2016: 72ff; Cevolani 2017). Martin Smith (2016: 86ff) 
discusses cases where we learn of a base rate or get statistical evidence against some proposition 
for which we previously had good evidence. For example, suppose a bus hits someone on a busy 
street, you have reliable testimonial evidence that the bus was owned by the Blue Bus Company. 
Then, you learn that, on the day of the incident, only 5% of the buses operating in that part of 
town were owned by the Blue Bus Company. That doesn’t seem like a good reason to give up your 
belief that the Blue Bus Company was responsible—after all, you have reliable testimonial evidence 
supporting this proposition. Nonetheless, learning this statistic affects the probability that the Blue 
Bus Company was responsible. Given the eyewitness is 85% reliable, you can use Bayesian 
likelihoods to calculate the probability the Blue Bus Company did it—and this turns out to be 
around 23%.9  
 
Buchak (2021) discusses related cases in which we receive counterevidence to propositions at the 
core of our web of belief—whether that be our religious views, moral commitments, beliefs about 
our close friends and family, etc. Buchak suggests that the counterevidence might make us doubt 
                                                        
8 Thanks to Francesco Praolini for helpful discussion. 
9 Call (A) the proposition that 85% reliable an eyewitness testified it was blue and (C) the proposition that 5% of the 
buses in town that day were operated by the Blue Bus Company, and (B) the proposition that the Blue Bus Company 
is guilty. Then:  
 
Pr(B|C) = 0.05; Pr (~B|C) = 0.95 
Pr(A|B&C) = 0.85; Pr (A|~B&C) = 0.15 
Pr(B|A&C) = (Pr(B|C)*Pr(A|B&C)) / ((Pr(B|C)*Pr(A|B&C) + Pr(~B|C)*Pr(A|~B&C))  
Therefore, Pr(B|A&C) = (0.05*0.85)/((0.05*0.85) + (0.95*0.15)) = ~0.23  
 
So, given our evidence (i.e., A and C), the probability that the blue bus is guilty is ~23%. See Smith (2016: ch. 4). 
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the claim in question, and thus lower our credence, but we can continue to believe the claim in 
question—in part, because of the epistemic benefits of belief if the claim turns out to be true. 
Buchak suggests that A could rationally believe p and B could rationally believe not-p, but A and 
B could both end up with the same rational credence in p. Buchak (2021) and Jackson (2019-a) 
suggest this is a way to capture the idea that rational faith remains steadfast in light of 
counterevidence. 
 
The general idea in these cases is that rational belief and rational credence are sensitive to different 
features of a body of evidence (Buchak 2014: 295). Some kinds of evidence, like statistical evidence, 
move around our credences, even drastically, but need not change our beliefs. This suggests that 
believing p could be rational even if one’s credence in p is lower than 0.5.10  
 
4.2 Objection 2: Should we ever stop believing our philosophical theories?  
 
One might worry that my view implies that we should never stop believing our philosophical 
theories. This seems like a bad result. Rational belief is sensitive to new evidence, and rational 
people do not disregard counterevidence. But if the correct attitude to take toward our 
philosophical theories is belief and middling to low credence, then it’s not clear when we should 
stop believing a philosophical theory.  
 
In response, we should, at some point, stop believing certain philosophical theories. While, for the 
sake of being ecumenical, I won’t take a precise stance here, there are two main views on when. 
First, if one combines my view with a version of the Lockean thesis, then one should stop believing 
a philosophical view when their credence falls below the permissibility threshold. However, recall 
that, as discussed above, Lockeans that accept my view will want to set the threshold quite low—
i.e. in the 0.5 range.  
 
If the Lockean thesis is false, then one will have an alternative, non-probabilistic account of 
rational belief—e.g. Buchak (2014)’s statistical evidence account, Jackson (2020)’s salience 
account, or Smith (2016)’s normic support account. What unifies most of these accounts is that 
rational belief isn’t determined by a probabilistic threshold, but on what kind of evidence you have 
for or against your philosophical views. For example, Buchak argues that some kinds of evidence, 
like statistical evidence, can move one’s credences all over the place but ought not change one’s 
beliefs. However, if one receives reliable testimony, then that’s the kind of evidence that could 
change one’s beliefs. In the case of philosophical views, one might think that disagreement doesn’t 
have the same epistemic force as, for example, a solid deductive argument against your view that 
you have no response to. The latter may provide a reason to give up your beliefs, whereas the 
former should merely lower your credence.  
 
4.3 Objection 3: Intuitive cases of conciliationism 
 
One might wonder what my view says about cases of mundane disagreements, such as 
Christensen's restaurant case. Should I really continue to believe everyone’s share is $43, even though 
you’ve calculated $45?  
 
In response, recall that my view applies only to philosophical views. Cases of mundane 
disagreement don’t involve philosophical views. Maybe belief-conciliationism is appropriate in 
some cases of mundane disagreement, but not in cases of deep disagreement that involves 
propositions at the core of one’s web of belief (see Pittard 2019.) Buchak (2021: sec. 7) argues that 
                                                        
10 For additional cases and further discussion of the independence of belief and credence, see Jackson (2022). 
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many of the epistemic benefits of steadfastness don’t apply in cases of mundane disagreement: 
“you don’t care that much about maintaining a correct belief on this topic over time, you don’t 
have a lot of other beliefs that depend on presupposing this calculation in your reasoning, you are 
not already involved in a long-term course of action on its basis, and so forth.” Thus, while my 
view does not take a stand on what to do in cases of mundane disagreement, a more rigorous 
conciliation may be appropriate.  
 
4.4 Objection 4: Belief, credence, action? 
 
Suppose a rational person believes p with a middling or low credence in p. This raises questions 
about how they ought to act. Suppose that the truth of p is relevant to some decision they are 
making. In deciding how to act, should they rely on their belief that p or their credence in p?11  
 
This is a difficult question, and I am not fully satisfied with my current thoughts on the matter. 
However, here are a few preliminary responses.  
 
First, a version of this question is a problem for a most of the plausible views about what attitude 
we should take to our favorite philosophical theories. Most proponents of the no-belief view 
nonetheless think we can accept our favorite philosophical views, champion them, and act as if they 
are true. The question arises: should we always accept them? And if not, when should we accept 
them, and we should we act on our low credence that they are true?  
 
That said, I do think that we can air on the side of acting on our beliefs (perhaps with certain 
exceptions, e.g. cases where doing so would involve a serious risk). One reason to think this is 
because of the epistemic benefits of disagreement—these benefits are better gleaned if people are 
asserting their favorite theories, arguing for them, publishing in their favor, etc. In many cases, 
there’s much to be gained if one acts on their believed theory, and it turns out to be true.  
 
Some of the trickier cases involve philosophical matters that have practical implications outside of 
research contexts, and especially ones that are associated with a serious moral risk if one is in error. 
For example, suppose you have the philosophical view that is it permissible to eat factory farmed 
meat, but due to philosophical disagreement, your credence in this is middling or low. Instead of 
relying on your belief when deciding what to buy at the grocery store, wouldn’t it nonetheless be 
appropriate for you to air on the side of caution, because of the moral risk if your belief is false? 
These kinds of cases suggest that, even if we can rationally believe our philosophical views, it may 





I’ve argued that it is epistemically permissible for philosophers to believe their favorite 
philosophical theories; however, they should have middling or even low credences in them. First, 
I raised some problems for the way that the no-belief view relies on conciliationism. I explained 
why my approach can solve problems that conciliationism creates for my opponents, while doing 
justice to many of the intuitions that underlie conciliationism. I then provided two additional 
arguments for my view: one regarding the roles of belief and credence, and the second on why 
believing philosophical theories is preferable to accepting them. Finally, I addressed four 
objections, including the worry that it seems irrational to believe something if one has a middling 
                                                        
11 Thanks to Alexandra Lloyd and Sarah Moss for raising this worry. 
12 However, simply because we cannot rely on a belief in a context doesn’t mean we have to give it up. See Alonso 
(2014) and Jackson (2019-b) for more on the distinction between having a belief and relying on a belief.  
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or low credence in it. I conclude that philosophers should not shy away from believing their 
philosophical views, but also should be careful not to be overconfident in them.  
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